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Abstract—The use of supervised Machine Learning (ML) to enhance Intrusion Detection Systems has been the subject of significant
research. Supervised ML is based upon learning by example, demanding significant volumes of representative instances for effective
training and the need to re-train the model for every unseen cyber-attack class. However, retraining the models in-situ renders the
network susceptible to attacks owing to the time-window required to acquire a sufficient volume of data. Although anomaly detection
systems provide a coarse-grained defence against unseen attacks, these approaches are significantly less accurate and suffer from
high false-positive rates. Here, a complementary approach referred to as ‘One-Shot Learning’, whereby a limited number of examples
of a new attack-class is used to identify a new attack-class (out of many) is detailed. The model grants a new cyber-attack classification
without retraining. A Siamese Network is trained to differentiate between classes based on pairs similarities, rather than features,
allowing to identify new and previously unseen attacks. The performance of a pre-trained model to classify attack-classes based only
on one example is evaluated using three datasets. Results confirm the adaptability of the model in classifying unseen attacks and the
trade-off between performance and the need for distinctive class representation.
Index Terms—Artificial Neural Network, Continuous Learning, CICIDS2017, Intrusion Detection, KDD Cup’99, NSL-KDD, Machine
Learning, One-Shot Learning, Siamese Network.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
INtrusion Detection System (IDS) development has itsroots in statistical models [1], and has recently evolved
to the use of Machine Learning (ML) [2] based on hybrid
models and adaptive techniques [3]. Developments to date
have highlighted two fundamental considerations in the
design of effective supervised ML-based IDS; (a) availability
of a large and representative historian of cyber-attacks con-
sisting of many thousands of instances [4] and (b) the time
window resulting from the need to retrain models after the
emergence of a new attack class has been recorded, renders
the network open to damaging attacks. Supervised ML
models are very accurate at identifying cyber-attacks pre-
viously been trained to recognise, but significantly under-
perform for new unseen and ‘zero-day’ attacks that emerge.
Anomaly detection approaches have been explored to ad-
dress the issue and whilst these schemes provide better
performance against unseen attacks, their efficacy is inferior
against known attacks when compared to supervised ML
approaches. Further, anomaly-based approaches are also
limited under multiple new attacks scenarios as they are
simply classified into the same anomalous group, in so do-
ing restricting the range of attack-specific countermeasures
that can be employed.
Here, the development and evaluation of an ML-enabled
approach that provides improved attack identification in
the period between a range of previously unseen attacks at
onset is reported and the deployment of a robust supervised
ML model that informs on the most effective countermea-
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sures. The methodology - referred to as One-Shot Learning
- centres on the use of a Siamese Network, shown to be
effective in identifying new classes based on one (or only a
few) examples of a new class. An alternative approach is to
create synthetic examples based on the domain knowledge
of new attacks; however, this is challenging requiring a
considerable amount of time to replicate a suitable represen-
tation of an environment with appropriate parameters, and
is consequently subject to human error owing to cognitive
biases.
One-Shot Learning was inspired by the generalisation
learning ability of human beings. As discussed by Vinyals et
al. [5], “Humans learn new concepts with very little supervi-
sion, yet our best deep learning systems need hundreds or
thousands of examples” [5]. Therefore, One-Shot learning
models aim at classifying previously unseen classes using
one instance. The idea is to rely on previously seen classes
and learn patterns and similarities instead of fitting the ML
model to fixed classes. Few-Shot (N-Shot) learning is similar
to One-Shot learning with a flexibility of using a few (N)
instances to classify a class instead of one [6].
A Siamese Network is a network composed of two
“twin” networks that are trained simultaneously to learn
the similarity of two instances called a pair. Leveraging this
similarity-based learning, a previously unseen class could
be added to the network without retraining. The initial stage
of the development is the training phase. The Siamese Net-
work is trained using similarities that discriminate between
K classes; benign traffic and the K − 1 classes of known
cyber-attacks. Any new traffic instance P is then compared
against all known classes (used during training) plus an
additional class (K+1 classes) where only a limited number
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of examples of class ‘K + 1’ are available, such as might be
the case on the appearance of a new cyber-attack. This is
achieved without any form of additional training.
The contributions of the paper are; (a) the use of a
Siamese Network model to successfully classify cyber-
attacks based on pair similarities, not proposed for Cyber
Security usage to date. (b) evaluation of the proposed model
performance to detect a new cyber-attack class based on one
labelled instance without re-training. (c) comparison of the
impact of a few labelled instances of the new attack class on
detection performance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows;
Section 2 details the main features of Siamese Networks;
Section 3 presents the methodology governing the training
of the Siamese Network and its evaluation is explained
showing the potential of the network to identify a new
attack class based on a few (previously collected and la-
belled) examples of that attack class without retraining.
Section 4 presents the properties of the data sets and their
corresponding attack classes used in model development
and performance evaluation; ; the performance of the model
is assessed in Section 5; conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
In supervised machine learning, a relationship exists be-
tween model complexity and the volume of training data;
too few training examples and the model will over-fit,
resulting in an unnecessarily complex model that produces
poor results. Therefore, securing sufficient and representa-
tive data is a limiting factor in model development and
performance [7]. In practice, accessing and/or generating
sufficiently large and representative training examples is
a complex challenge and may involve significant manual
effort and processing time [8]. Nonetheless, there are pub-
licly available data sets for training IDS systems, notably
the CICIDS2017 and the NSL-KDD sets. These data are
used to pre-train the Siamese Network, subsequently, in the
evaluation of the performance of the model in identifying
a new class of attack after a limited number of that class’
samples has been recorded.
An alternative approach is to utilise ‘Transfer Learning’
to mitigate the need for large volumes of training data [9],
[10]. The premise of Transfer Learning to solve the target
problem T (where data are limited), is to create a model M
for a similar problem T ′ where large amounts of data are
readily available. The initial model M is then ‘transferred’
to the target problem T and partially re-trained on the small
data set. The rationale is that the initial training on T ′, yields
training weights which discover features useful for the
problem domain and hence applicable to the target problem
T ; hence after retraining, the model learns and generalises
faster on the small data set [11]. Transfer Learning is a
common approach in the image processing domain [12]
where for example, models are trained on the ImageNet
data set [13], [14], [15]. Despite the potential of Transfer
Learning as a viable solution, it does not eliminate the need
for retraining.
One-Shot learning, first reported by Li Fei-Fei et al. [16],
is inspired by human generalisation learning and has been
applied in multiple domains with the most prominent being
image and video processing [17], [18], [19]. It has also
been used in other domains, such as robotics [20], language
processing [21], [22] and drug discovery [23]. Based on the
literature, the Siamese Network is the most frequently used.
Various architectures have been proposed and assessed as
the building block for the twin network (i.e., CNN [24],
[25], RNN [26] and GNN [27]). Matching Networks [5],
Prototypical Networks [28], Imitation Learning [29] and
Autoencoders [30], particularly in the image processing
domain, but amenable to be generalised to other domains.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the development
reported here is the first proposing a One-Shot IDS model
implementation.
2.1 Siamese Network Architecture
Siamese Networks were first introduced by Bromley et
al. [31] in the 90s to solve the problem of matching hand-
written signatures, subsequently adapted to other domains.
Popular implementations of Siamese Networks for image
and video processing are presented by Koch et al. [32], Yao et
al. [33] and Varior et al. [34]. Moreover, it has been imple-
mented for Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks [35],
[36] and for the retrieval of similar questions [37].
Figure 1 depicts the Siamese network architecture. As
shown, the network is composed of two identical sub-
networks that share weights. Twin networks pass their out-
put to a similarity module, which in turn is responsible for
calculating the distance defining “how alike” the two inputs
are. The output is compared to the given similarity (i.e.
whether or not the pair are similar), the loss is calculated,
and the weights are then adjusted.
Network
X
x1
Pair	(x1,	x2)	
Similar	(0,	1)
x2
Similar	and
Dissimilar	Pairs
Network
YShare	Weights
Output
Similar	/	Not	Similar
Similarity	Check/
Euclidean	Distance	
*	X	and	Y	are	Twin	Networks
Calculate	Constructive	Loss
Update	Weights
Fig. 1. Siamese Network Architecture.
Formally [32], [38], given a pair of inputs (x1, x2) and
a twin network (X,Y ), such that x1 is the input of X and
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x2 is the input of Y , the similarity can be computed using
Euclidean distance (equation 1):
d =|| f1(x1)− f2(x2) ||2 (1)
such that f1 and f2 are the outputs of Networks X and
Y respectively f1 ≡ f2 since X and Y are twin networks.
Ultimately, the training goal is to minimise the overall loss
l as defined in Equation 2; for each given batch i of input
pairs (x1, x2)i and label vector yi, such that yi(x1, x2)i = 1
if x1 and x2 belong to the same class and 0 otherwise.
l(x1, x2)i = y(x1, x2)i log di + (1− y(x1, x2)i) log(1− di)
+λ | w | ∗2
(2)
such that λ is a l2 regularisation parameter.
However, the loss function is sensitive to outliers (i.e.
dissimilar pairs with large distances) which disproportion-
ately affect the gradient estimation. An alternative loss func-
tion is the constructive loss shown in equation 3 proposed
by Chopra, Hadsell and LeCun [39], [40]. The constructive
loss caps the contribution of dissimilar pairs if the distance
is within a specified margin m [40], hence limiting the effect
of large distances.
l(x1, x2) =
B∑
n=1
y(x1, x2)i ∗ (di)2
+ (1− y(x1, x2)i) ∗ (max(m− di, 0))2
(3)
such that m > 0 is a margin. In this study, the margin was
set to m = 1 [40].
After training, given any two pairs, the network is ca-
pable of calculating their degree of similarity, di ∈ [0, 1], di
mirror the degree of similarity for the pair; the lower the
di, the closer the pair. Batches of pairs are used to train the
network. Note, however, that an equal number of similar
and dissimilar pairs are used in the batch.
Here, Feed-forward Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
are used as the building block of the twin network. The de-
tails of the architecture (i.e., the number of layers, neurons,
etc.) are provided in Section 3.
3 SIAMESE NETWORK MODEL
In this section, the proposed Siamese Network model is
used as the One-Shot learning architecture. The performance
of the network on classifying a new cyber-attack class with-
out the need to retrain is evaluated with the new attack class
represented by a limited number of labelled samples.
Figure 2 shows the process of establishing the intrusion
detection model based on one-shot learning and illustrates
the methodology of assessing performance for new attack
classes without retraining the model.
Given a data set with N classes, first, an attack class e is
chosen to act as the new cyber-attack; this class is excluded
from the training process (Figure 2-(1)). Second, for the
remaining K classes after excluding e (N − 1 classes), each
class instances are split into two, as shown in Figure 2-(2).
Collectively, the first ‘half’ is used as a pool of instances to
generate the training set pairs both similar and dissimilar,
Dataset
N	classes
3-	Split	e
50%	testing	(labelled)	
50%	testing	(unknown)
6-	Train	Siamese	Network	using	B
4-	Generate	Training	Batch	B	with	
						*	M	Similar	Pairs	
													equal	number	of	pairs	for	each	class		
						*	M	Dissimilar	Pairs
													equal	number	of	pairs	for	all	classes	combinations
Yes No
Correct	Class	has
Highest	Vote?
Correct
Classification False	
For	each	testing	instance	ti
5-	Generate	Testing	Batch	T	with	t	instances	for	each	class
					ti	contains	N*j	pairs	(j	pairs	with	each	class)
7-	Evaluation
Calculate	similarity	with	class	pairs
Voting	(pair	with	closest	similarity)
1-	Choose	class	e	to	be
excluded	from	training
2-	Split	each	class	(except	e)	into	
50%	training
50%	testing
      Mock new attack with 
      labelled instances
Fig. 2. Siamese Network for Intrusion Detection System (One-Shot).
as shown in Figure 2-(4); the second ‘half’ is used as the
evaluation pool of instances.
Class e is used to mimic a real-life situation in which
a new attack is detected with only a few labelled samples
available. Therefore, the instances of e are split in two halves
(Figure 2-(3)), the first half representing a pool of labelled
and the second half a pool of unlabelled (new) instances.
Since the model relies on random pair generation, pairs
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are drawn out randomly from the pools of instances. The
rational for having pools of instances and to draw out
pairs randomly is to hinder any selection bias either dur-
ing training (i.e. selecting similar and dissimilar pairs) or
during evaluation of the new class (i.e. selecting the labelled
instances that best represent this class). Furthermore, the
uniqueness of the pairs - no duplicates - is ensured. A “set”
data structure is used. it is added to the batch of pairs
unless that pair is already contained within the set. This
is demonstrated in Algorithm 2.
During evaluation, an instance i is paired with one
random instance from each class. The instances are drawn
out of the pool of testing instances, resulting in N pairs.
The similarity is then calculated for the N pairs. Instance
i is classified (labelled) based on the pair with the highest
similarity (i.e. least distance).
As discussed in Section 5, to determine the trade-off
between the number of labelled instances of the new attack
class and accuracy, the process is repeated j times for each
instance i. Majority voting is then applied to deduce the
instance label; the class with the highest votes is used as
instance i label (Figure 2-(7)).
Algorithm 1 summarises the overall process of training
and testing the model. Initially, the data set is split as shown
in Figure 2. The model is trained for a specified number
of epochs with the generated batch of pairs as described in
Algorithm 2. The batch size = 30, 000 is based on the liter-
ature recommendation for the advisable Siamese Network
training batch size [32], [41], [42]. It is important to note that
the classes are equally represented in both the training and
testing batches. Note that the data set should have at least 3
classes, otherwise, the model converges to a 50% similarity
output and fails to train adequately. Algorithm 2 shows the
training batch generation process.
An equal number of instances are used from each class
for evaluation (Algorithm 3). For each new instance, a pair
is selected with each class using the new instance and a
random instance from each class. The similarity is calculated
for each pair. The pair with the closest similarity contributes
to the classification result. The process is performed j
times and majority voting is used to collate the results
(j ∈ 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30). For class e (the attack class that
Algorithm 1 Train and Test Siamese Network
Input: Attacks Dataset
Output: Trained Siamese Network Evaluation
Ensure: dataset = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} s.th. n ≥ 3
1: train batch size, test batch size← 30, 000
2: n epochs← 2000
3: excluded class = random class e s.th. e ∈ dataset
4: training classes = dataset− e
5: training = 50% ci ∀ci ∈ training classes
6: testing = dataset ∩ training
7: batch← GETTRAININGBATCH(train batch size)
8: Build Siamese Network with Random Weights
9: for i = 0 to n iterations do
10: Update Siamese Network Weights based on batch
11: end for
12: EVALUATE(test batch size)
Algorithm 2 Generate Training Batch
Input: Dataset of K(N − 1) classes, Batch Size
Output: Batch of similar and dissimilar pairs
and associated labels (0: dissimilar, 1: similar)
1: function GETTRAININGBATCH(batch size)
2: num similar pairs = batch size/2
3: num dissimilar pairs = batch size/2
4: num similar pairs per class
= num similar pairs/K
5: all combinations = combinations(K)
6: num dissimilar pairs per combination
= num dissimilar pairs/len(all combinations)
7: pairs set← {}
8: for c in K do
9: for i = 0 to num similar pairs per class do
10: (ins1, ins2)← 2 random instances ∈ ci
11: if (ins1, ins2) ∈ pairs set then
12: go to 10
13: end if
14: pairs[i]← {ins1, ins2}
15: pairs set.add({ins1, ins2})
16: end for
17: end for
18: for c1, c2 in all combinations do
19: for i = 0 to
num dissimilar pairs per combination do
20: ins1 ← random instance ∈ c1
21: ins2 ← random instance ∈ c2
22: if (ins1, ins2) ∈ pairs set then
23: go to 20
24: end if
25: pairs[i]← {ins1, ins2}
26: pairs set.add({ins1, ins2})
27: end for
28: end for
29: targets[0..batch size/2]← 0 . Similar
30: targets[batch size/2..batch size]← 1 . Dissimilar
31: return pairs, targets
32: end function
is excluded from training), the first half acts as the pool
of labelled and the second half act as the pool of new
unlabelled instances.
The model evaluation yields a Confusion Matrix (CM)
that visualises the performance. A sample CM is presented
in Table 1. Each row of the CM represents a class; True
Positive (TP) is the number of attack instances correctly clas-
sified as attack; True Negative (TN) is the number of normal
instances correctly classified as normal; False Positive (FP)
is the number of normal instances wrongly classified as
attack; False Negative (FN) is the number of attack instances
wrongly classified as normal.
The overall accuracy is calculated as shown in Equation 4.
True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Negative Rate (FPR)
for each class are shown in Equation 5 and Equation 6
respectively; finally, True Negative Rate (TNR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR) are calculated using Equation 7 and
Equation 8 respectively.
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Algorithm 3 Evaluate Model
Input: Trained Siamese Network, Batch Size, Excluded
Class (e)
Output: Accuracy
1: function EVALUATE(batch size)
2: n correct← 0
3: num per class← batch size/N
4: for c in N do
5: for i = 0 to num per class do
6: for j = 0 to 5 do
7: if c == e then
8: ins1 ←
random instance ∈ c testing
9: else
10: ins1 ←
random instance ∈ e unlabelled
11: end if
12: pairs← (ins1,
random instance ∈ x∀x ∈ K)
13: pairs.append(ins1,
random instance ∈ e labelled
14: similarities← model.predict(pairs)
15: votes[argmin(similarities)]+ = 1
16: end for
17: if argmax(votes) == c then
18: n correct+ = n correct+ 1
19: end if
20: confusion matrix[c, argmax(votes)]+ = 1
21: end for
22: end for
23: accuracy = n correct ∗ 100/batch size
24: return accuracy, confusion matrix
25: end function
TABLE 1
Sample Confusion Matrix
Predicted Class
Correct Normal Attack1 Attack2 Attack3 Attack4
Normal TN FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4
Attack1 FN1 TP11 TP12 TP13 TP14
Attack2 FN2 TP21 TP22 TP23 TP24
Attack3 FN3 TP31 TP32 TP33 TP34
Attack4 FN4 TP41 TP42 TP43 TP44
OverallAccuracy =
TN +
∑4
i=1 TPii
TN +
∑4
i=1
∑4
j=1 TPij +
∑4
i=1 FPi +
∑4
i=1 FNi
(4)
TPRi =
TPii
FNi +
∑4
j=1 TPij
(5)
FNRi =
FNi
FNi +
∑4
j=1 TPij
(6)
TNR =
TN
TN +
∑4
i=1 FPi
(7)
FPR =
∑4
i=1 FPi
TN +
∑4
i=1 FPi
(8)
4 DATASETS
Three data sets are used to evaluate the proposed models;
two benchmark IDS data sets, specifically, CICIDS2017 and
NSL-KDD and KDD Cup’99. The latter is used in compar-
ison to the NSL-KDD to demonstrate the effectiveness of
clean data when generating training pairs and also, when
introducing new attacks to the trained model.
Each data set contains N classes. K classes are used to
train the network, such that K = N − 1. The K classes
include normal/benign and K − 1 attack classes. The in-
stances of each of the K class act as a pool used to generate
similar and dissimilar pairs. Furthermore, one class is used
to simulate a new attack, mimicking the situations in which
little/limited data is available for a new attack. The pair
generation details and the experiments are further discussed
in Section 3.
An overview of each data set is presented in the follow-
ing subsections.
4.1 CICIDSS2017
CICIDS2017 [43] is a recent data set generated by the
Canadian Institute for Cyber-security (CIC) comprising up-
to-date benign, insider and outsider attacks. Traffic flows
were generated and labelled using the provided ‘.pcap’
files. Table 2 lists the attacks used and the number of
instances/flows for each.
TABLE 2
CICIDS Classes and Corresponding Number of Occurrences (1)
Class # of Occurrences
1 Normal 248607 (90.50%)
2 DoS (Hulk) 14427 (5.25%)
3 DoS (Slowloris) 2840 (1.03%)
4 FTP Brute Force 5228 (1.9%)
5 SSH Brute Force 3627 (1.32%)
4.2 KDD Cup’99
The KDD Cup’99 [44], although old, is still considered as the
classic benchmark data set used in the evaluation of IDS per-
formance. More than 60% of the research in the past decade
(2008 - 2018) has been evaluated using KDD’99 [3]. KDD
Cup’99 covers 4 attack classes alongside normal activity. The
attacks contained in the data set are; Denial of Service (DoS),
Root to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R) and probing.
The KDD Cup’99 data set is relatively large, however, the
provider has made available a reduced subset of ˜10% [45].
For the purposes of evaluation here, only the smaller subset
is used. Table 3 shows the number of instances per class for
the KDD Cup’99 data set.
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TABLE 3
KDD Cup’99 Classes and Corresponding Number of Occurrences
Class # of Occurrences
1 Normal 97278 (19.70%)
2 DoS 391458 (79.24%)
3 Probe 4107 (0.82%)
4 U2R 1128 (0.23%)
5 R2L 52 (0.01%)
4.3 NSL-KDD
The NSL-KDD [46] data set was proposed by the CIC to
overcome the problems of the KDD Cup’99 set discussed
by Tavallaee et al. [47]. Similar to KDD Cup’99, NSL-KDD
covers 4 attack classes alongside normal activity. NSL-KDD
is used for evaluating the effect of enhancing and filtering a
data set on the similarity learning and performance. Table 4
shows the number of instances per class for the NSL-KDD
data set.
TABLE 4
NSL-KDD Classes and Corresponding Number of Occurrences
Class # of Occurrences
1 Normal 67343 (53.46%)
2 DoS 45927 (36.47%)
3 Probe 11656 (9.25%)
4 U2R 995 (0.78%)
5 R2L 52 (0.04%)
NSL-KDD and KDD Cup’99 data sets have already been
pre-processed and 42 features extracted, a total of 118
features after encoding the categorical features. For the
CICIDS2017, 31 bidirectional flow features are extracted. It
is worth noting that no feature engineering or selection is
performed to ensure that the excluded class from training
does not indirectly influence the feature set.
Recent surveys examined the use of ML for IDS [48]. Fur-
thermore, Thomas and Pavithran [49] study the recent ML
techniques evaluated using the NSL-KDD data set. While,
Panwar et al. [50] evaluate the usage of ML on CICIDS-
2017 data set. Although there are various manuscript using
ML for IDS, comparing the proposed model with recent
IDS models is not applicable. This is because the proposed
model leverages One-Shot learning, therefore, it cannot be
in comparison with classical classification models.
5 ONE-SHOT EVALUATION
The evaluation specifies how accurately the proposed net-
work can classify both classes used in training and new
attack classes without the need for retraining. The model
leverages similarity-based learning. The new attack class is
represented using one sample to mimic the labelling process
of new attacks.
For each data set evaluation, multiple experiments are
conducted. Specifically, K (N − 1) experiments are evalu-
ated, where N is the number of classes and K is the number
of attack classes in order to evaluate the performance of
the Siamese Network when using a different set of attack
classes for training and evaluation. In each experiment, a
separate attack class (e) is excluded, one at a time. The CM
is presented alongside the overall model accuracy for each
experiment.
The results of the evaluation of the performance im-
pact of the number of labelled samples (j) of the new
attack class e are presented in terms of overall accuracy,
new attack True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Negative
Rates (FNR), Normal True Negative Rate (TNR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR), listed using j instances for majority
voting, where j ∈ 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30. The CMs use j = 5.
First, the CMs of the CICIDS2017 One-Shot, excluding
SSH class is presented in Table 5 and excluding FTP in Ta-
ble 7. The overall accuracy is 81.28% and 82.5% respectively.
The results demonstrate the network capability to adapt
to the emergence of a new cyber-attack after training. It is
important to note that the new attack class performance is
73.03% and 70.03% for SSH and FTP respectively. Moreover,
the added class demonstrates low FNRs, specifically 8%
and 15% for FTP and SSH respectively. On inspection of
Table 6 and Table 8, it is evident that using five labelled
instances of the new attack class results in an increase in
both the overall accuracy and the TPR together with a drop
in the FNR. Using only 1 labelled instance demonstrates a
comparably poorer performance owing to the instance se-
lection randomness, which could result in either a good or a
bad class representative. However, using 5 random labelled
instances boosts performance, reinforcing the importance of
having distinctive class representatives.
The remainder of the CICIDS2017 performance evalua-
tion results are characterised by similar behaviour and are
listed as follows. DoS (Hulk) results are presented in Table 9
and Table 10, while DoS (Slowloris) in Table 11 and Table 12.
TABLE 5
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (SSH not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS(Hulk)
DoS
(Slowloris) FTP SSH Overall
Normal 4711(78.52%)
9
(0.15%)
103
(1.72%)
148
(2.47%)
1029
(17.15%)
81.28%
DoS
(Hulk)
93
(1.55%)
5745
(95.75%)
33
(0.55%)
43
(0.72%)
86
(1.43%)
DoS
(Slowloris)
507
(8.45%)
0
(0%)
4668
(77.8%)
143
(2.38%)
682
(11.37%)
FTP 643(10.72%)
1
(0.02%)
127
(2.12%)
4879
(81.32%)
350
(5.83%)
SSH 924(15.4%)
34
(0.57%)
310
(5.17%)
350
(5.83%)
4382
(73.03%)
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TABLE 6
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (SSH not in Training) Using Different
j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (SSH) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.72% 64.10% 16.43% 63.35% 36.65%
5 81.28% 73.03% 15.40% 78.52% 21.48%
10 82.56% 77.82% 13.40% 79.95% 20.05%
15 82.58% 78.43% 13.03% 79.92% 20.08%
20 82.49% 78.33% 13.18% 79.97% 20.03%
25 82.43% 78.30% 13.25% 79.78% 20.22%
30 82.49% 78.45% 13.13% 79.97% 20.03%
TABLE 7
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (FTP Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS(Hulk)
DoS
(Slowloris) FTP SSH Overall
Normal 5231(87.18%)
3
(0.05%)
152
(2.53%)
189
(3.15%)
425
(7.08%)
82.5%
DoS
(Hulk)
70
(1.17%)
5755
(95.92%)
48
(0.8%)
15
(0.25%)
112
(1.87%)
DoS
(Slowloris)
424
(7.07%)
1
(0.02%)
4433
(73.88%)
485
(8.08%)
657
(10.95%)
FTP 518(8.63%)
1
(0.02%)
659
(10.98%)
4202
(70.03%)
620
(10.33%)
SSH 546(9.1%)
3
(0.05%)
198
(3.3%)
124
(2.07%)
5129
(85.48%)
TABLE 8
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (FTP not in Training) Using Different j
Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (FTP) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.91% 59.65% 8.03% 72.83% 27.17%
5 82.5% 70.03% 8.63% 87.18% 12.82%
10 84.57% 72.8% 8.32% 87.70% 12.30%
15 85.47% 76.72% 8.12% 87.40% 12.60%
20 85.78% 77.58% 8.10% 87.23% 12.77%
25 85.86% 78.27% 8.10% 86.92% 13.08%
30 85.94% 78.48% 8.00% 86.73% 13.27%
TABLE 9
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (DoS(Hulk) Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS(Hulk)
DoS
(Slowloris) FTP SSH Overall
Normal 4314(71.9%)
1095
(18.25%)
174
(2.9%)
113
(1.88%)
304
(5.07%)
80.81%
DoS
(Hulk)
78
(1.3%)
5708
(95.13%)
60
(1%)
58
(0.97%)
96
(1.6%)
DoS
(Slowloris)
451
(7.52%)
51
(0.85%)
4767
(79.45%)
111
(1.85%)
620
(10.33%)
FTP 624(10.4%)
171
(2.85%)
138
(2.3%)
4521
(75.35%)
546
(9.1%)
SSH 597(9.95%)
26
(0.43%)
245
(4.08%)
198
(3.3%)
4934
(82.23%)
TABLE 10
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (DoS (Hulk) not in Training) Using
Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (Hulk) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.28% 91.07% 4.90% 58.05% 41.95%
5 80.81% 95.13% 1.30% 71.90% 28.10%
10 82.59% 95.22% 1.22% 75.58% 24.42%
15 82.54% 95.23% 1.20% 74.67% 25.33%
20 82.86% 95.2% 1.20% 76.02% 23.98%
25 82.76% 95.2% 1.15% 75.50% 24.50%
30 82.93% 95.18% 1.22% 76.15% 23.85%
TABLE 11
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (Dos(Slowloris) Not in
Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS(Hulk)
DoS
(Slowloris) FTP SSH Overall
Normal 5307(88.45%)
6
(0.1%)
459
(7.65%)
64
(1.07%)
164
(2.73%)
81.07%
DoS
(Hulk)
37
(0.62%)
5794
(96.57%)
65
(1.08%)
53
(0.88%)
51
(0.85%)
DoS
(Slowloris)
574
(9.57%)
26
(0.43%)
4024
(67.07%)
582
(9.7%)
794
(13.23%)
FTP 482(8.03%)
1
(0.02%)
598
(9.97%)
4639
(77.32%)
280
(4.67%)
SSH 446(7.43%)
0
(0%)
817
(13.62%)
181
(3.02%)
4556
(75.93%)
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TABLE 12
CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (DoS (Slowloris) not in Training)
Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (Slowloris) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.28% 50.97% 11.50% 72.65% 27.35%
5 80.81% 67.07% 9.57% 88.45% 11.55%
10 82.59% 71.38% 7.38% 89.48% 10.52%
15 82.54% 72.2% 7.18% 89.37% 10.63%
20 82.86% 72.77% 6.85% 89.67% 10.33%
25 82.76% 72.93% 6.58% 89.65% 10.35%
30 82.93% 72.82% 6.68% 89.70% 10.30%
The CMs of the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD data sets
One-Shot, excluding the DoS attack from training are pre-
sented in Table 13 and Table 15, respectively; the overall
accuracies are 76.67% and 77.99%. It is important to note
however, that the False Negative rates for the new class
(i.e. DoS) are 26.38% for the KDD Cup’99 and 9.87% for the
NSL-KDD. Additional to the observations arising from the
CICIDS2017 evaluation, these results highlight two further
elements; (a) the Siamese Network did not find a high
similarity between the new attack and the normal instances;
(b) the new attack class TPR in the NSL-KDD results is
significantly higher than KDD Cup’99 (78.87% compared to
40.28%), because the NSL-KDD is an enhanced version of
the KDD Cup’99 (filtered and duplicate instances removed).
Knowing that the new class is not used in the training phase
and the similarity is only calculated from a few instances,
a better representation of instances improves performance
(i.e. NSL-KDD instances). Results confirm that new labelled
instances need to be appropriate representatives.
In consideration of completeness, the remaining NSL-
KDD and the KDD Cup’99 results - which demonstrate
similar performance - are listed as follows; excluding Probe
results are listed in Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 and Table 20;
Table 25, Table 26, Table 27 and Table 28 present the results
when excluding R2L; Finally, excluding U2R are in Table 21,
Table 22, Table 23 and Table 24.
TABLE 13
KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (DoS Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 4562(76.03%)
243
(4.05%)
522
(8.7%)
579
(9.65%)
94
(1.57%)
76.67%DoS
1583
(26.38%)
2417
(40.28%)
1831
(30.52%)
168
(2.8%)
1
(0.02%)
Probe 159(2.65%)
214
(3.57%)
5367
(89.45%)
242
(4.03%)
18
(0.3%)
R2L 56(0.93%)
275
(4.58%)
10
(0.17%)
5571
(92.85%)
88
(1.47%)
U2R 17(0.28%)
205
(3.42%)
655
(10.92%)
40
(0.67%)
5083
(84.72%)
TABLE 14
KDD One-Shot Accuracy (DoS not in Training) Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (DoS) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 66.89% 41.67% 22.50% 66.35% 33.65%
5 76.67% 40.28% 26.38% 76.03% 23.97%
10 77.57% 40.07% 27.25% 76.10% 23.90%
15 77.67% 39.9% 27.32% 76.02% 23.98%
20 77.68% 39.93% 27.38% 76.02% 23.98%
25 77.68% 39.87% 27.40% 76.07% 23.93%
30 77.68% 39.88% 27.40% 76.03% 23.97%
TABLE 15
NSL-KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (DoS Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 5593(93.22%)
61
(1.02%)
136
(2.27%)
122
(2.03%)
88
(1.47%)
77.99%DoS
592
(9.87%)
4732
(78.87%)
653
(10.88%)
12
(0.2%)
11
(0.18%)
Probe 67(1.12%)
3305
(55.08%)
2595
(43.25%)
19
(0.32%)
14
(0.23%)
R2L 212(3.53%)
7
(0.12%)
27
(0.45%)
5692
(94.87%)
62
(1.03%)
U2R 486(8.1%)
6
(0.1%)
31
(0.52%)
693
(11.55%)
4784
(79.73%)
TABLE 16
NSL-KDD One-Shot Accuracy (DoS not in Training) Using Different j
Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (DoS) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.75% 67.35% 9.05% 84.87% 15.13%
5 77.99% 78.87% 9.87% 93.22% 6.78%
10 77.7% 84.62% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
15 79.05% 83.78% 9.87% 93.32% 6.68%
20 78.63% 85.25% 9.87% 93.37% 6.63%
25 79.49% 84.62% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
30 79.12% 85.37% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
TABLE 17
NSL-KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (Probe Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 5389(89.82%)
89
(1.48%)
195
(3.25%)
245
(4.08%)
82
(1.37%)
75.31%DoS
37
(0.62%)
5842
(97.37%)
95
(1.58%)
21
(0.35%)
5
(0.08%)
Probe 1697(28.28%)
2571
(42.85%)
565
(9.42%)
948
(15.8%)
219
(3.65%)
R2L 54(0.9%)
0
(0%)
55
(0.92%)
5800
(96.67%)
91
(1.52%)
U2R 263(4.38%)
0
(0%)
21
(0.35%)
720
(12%)
4996
(83.27%)
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TABLE 18
NSL-KDD One-Shot Accuracy (Probe not in Training) Using Different j
Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (Probe) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 70.62% 18.80% 24.78% 77.53% 22.47%
5 75.31% 9.42% 28.28% 89.82% 10.18%
10 75.2% 4.83% 28.82% 91.08% 8.92%
15 75.12% 4.05% 29.08% 91.18% 8.82%
20 75.11% 3.47% 29.20% 91.45% 8.55%
25 75% 3.02% 29.55% 91.35% 8.65%
30 74.94% 2.68% 29.68% 91.33% 8.67%
TABLE 19
KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (Probe Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 4515(75.25%)
16
(0.27%)
383
(6.38%)
1016
(16.93%)
70
(1.17%)
72.23%DoS
18
(0.3%)
5896
(98.27%)
81
(1.35%)
4
(0.07%)
1
(0.02%)
Probe 719(11.98%)
3707
(61.78%)
612
(10.2%)
941
(15.68%)
21
(0.35%)
R2L 26(0.43%)
0
(0%)
16
(0.27%)
5946
(99.1%)
12
(0.2%)
U2R 55(0.92%)
37
(0.62%)
264
(4.4%)
943
(15.72%)
4701
(78.35%)
TABLE 20
KDD One-Shot Accuracy (Probe not in Training) Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (Probe) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 66.72% 15.72% 11.77% 65.72% 34.28%
5 72.23% 10.2% 11.98% 75.25% 24.75%
10 72.59% 5.9% 13.30% 78.65% 21.35%
15 72.35% 4.82% 13.08% 78.57% 21.43%
20 72.26% 3.58% 13.50% 79.20% 20.80%
25 72.17% 3.05% 13.55% 79.23% 20.77%
30 72.07% 2.17% 13.98% 79.62% 20.38%
TABLE 21
NSL- KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (R2L Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 5199(86.65%)
24
(0.4%)
148
(2.47%)
530
(8.83%)
99
(1.65%)
80.16%DoS
15
(0.25%)
5799
(96.65%)
36
(0.6%)
26
(0.43%)
124
(2.07%)
Probe 90(1.5%)
242
(4.03%)
5416
(90.27%)
236
(3.93%)
16
(0.27%)
R2L 2526(42.1%)
1
(0.02%)
142
(2.37%)
2759
(45.98%)
572
(9.53%)
U2R 852(14.2%)
3
(0.05%)
0
(0%)
270
(4.5%)
4875
(81.25%)
TABLE 22
NSL-KDD One-Shot Accuracy (R2L not in Training) Using Different j
Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (R2L) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 74.5% 46.05% 38.13% 74.73% 25.27%
5 80.16% 45.98% 42.10% 86.65% 13.35%
10 80.79% 46.82% 41.58% 88.07% 11.93%
15 81.09% 49.02% 39.88% 87.72% 12.28%
20 81% 48.62% 40.38% 87.90% 12.10%
25 80.95% 48.37% 40.63% 87.88% 12.12%
30 80.91% 48.2% 40.93% 87.93% 12.07%
TABLE 23
KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (R2L Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 4288(71.47%)
1
(0.02%)
400
(6.67%)
730
(12.17%)
581
(9.68%)
74.2%DoS
10
(0.17%)
5909
(98.48%)
72
(1.2%)
9
(0.15%)
0
(0%)
Probe 90(1.5%)
160
(2.67%)
5338
(88.97%)
165
(2.75%)
247
(4.12%)
R2L 1702(28.37%)
2
(0.03%)
1344
(22.4%)
2148
(35.8%)
804
(13.4%)
U2R 527(8.78%)
1
(0.02%)
682
(11.37%)
213
(3.55%)
4577
(76.28%)
TABLE 24
KDD One-Shot Accuracy (R2L not in Training) Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (R2L) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 67.75% 38.48% 25.95% 59.65% 40.35%
5 74.2% 35.8% 28.37% 71.47% 28.53%
10 77.27% 42.22% 23.85% 74.38% 25.62%
15 78.34% 46.65% 22.05% 74.50% 25.50%
20 78.94% 49.18% 21.45% 74.62% 25.38%
25 79.44% 51.32% 20.72% 74.65% 25.35%
30 79.87% 53.35% 20.65% 74.55% 25.45%
TABLE 25
NSL-KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (U2R Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 4530(75.5%)
127
(2.12%)
76
(1.27%)
237
(3.95%)
1030
(17.17%)
77.04%DoS
120
(2%)
5771
(96.18%)
49
(0.82%)
16
(0.27%)
44
(0.73%)
Probe 43(0.72%)
304
(5.07%)
5574
(92.9%)
69
(1.15%)
10
(0.17%)
R2L 403(6.72%)
1
(0.02%)
27
(0.45%)
5238
(87.3%)
331
(5.52%)
U2R 2191(36.52%)
0
(0%)
221
(3.68%)
1589
(26.48%)
1999
(33.32%)
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TABLE 26
NSL-KDD One-Shot Accuracy (U2R not in Training) Using Different j
Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (U2R) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.42% 34.37% 35.55% 66.58% 33.42%
5 77.04% 33.32% 36.52% 75.50% 24.50%
10 77.08% 30.42% 36.95% 77.85% 22.15%
15 77.19% 30.2% 36.70% 78.22% 21.78%
20 77.12% 29.37% 36.67% 78.52% 21.48%
25 77.14% 28.85% 36.72% 78.87% 21.13%
30 77.12% 28.3% 37.10% 79.25% 20.75%
TABLE 27
KDD One-Shot Confusion Matrix (U2R Not in Training)
Predicted Class
Correct Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Overall
Normal 4146(69.1%)
5
(0.08%)
440
(7.33%)
796
(13.27%)
613
(10.22%)
75.72%DoS
7
(0.12%)
5921
(98.68%)
59
(0.98%)
6
(0.1%)
7
(0.12%)
Probe 53(0.88%)
384
(6.4%)
5449
(90.82%)
59
(0.98%)
55
(0.92%)
R2L 35(0.58%)
0
(0%)
13
(0.22%)
5849
(97.48%)
103
(1.72%)
U2R 958(15.97%)
1
(0.02%)
669
(11.15%)
3022
(50.37%)
1350
(22.5%)
TABLE 28
KDD One-Shot Accuracy (U2R not in Training) Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall New Class (U2R) Normal
(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 70.69% 21.40% 17.28% 59.27% 40.73%
5 75.72% 22.5% 15.97% 69.10% 30.90%
10 76.26% 21.82% 17.17% 72.18% 27.82%
15 76.33% 21.83% 17.15% 72.52% 27.48%
20 76.31% 21.48% 17.52% 72.72% 27.28%
25 76.34% 21.45% 17.55% 72.77% 27.23%
30 76.33% 21.27% 17.73% 72.90% 27.10%
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The paper presents an Intrusion Detection Siamese Network
framework capable of classifying new cyber-attacks based
on a limited number of labelled instances (One-Shot). The
evaluation of the model was performed on three different
data sets; CICIDS2017, KDD Cup’99 and the NSL-KDD, an
enhancement of the KDD Cup’99.
Results of the evaluation re-confirm that particular con-
sideration must be given on creating the training set, en-
suring an equal number of training pairs for every class
combination. The core requirement, in turn, presents a chal-
lenge of an exploding number of combinations between all
instances. Thus, distinct pairs are chosen to create large
batches in the region of 30,000 pairs to mitigate the growth.
During evaluation, similarity comparison using a single
point for each class resulted in noisy predictions due to
randomness obviated through the selection of multiple (j)
random instances from each class and aggregation using
majority voting.
Results demonstrate the ability of the proposed archi-
tecture to classify cyber-attacks based on learning from
similarity. Moreover, the results highlighted the need for
representative instances for the new attack class. Further-
more, evidence is provided to confirm the ability of One-
Shot learning methodologies to adapt to new cyber-attacks
without retraining when only a few instances are available
for a new attack. An overall accuracy of between 80% -
85% for the CICIDS2017 data set was evaluated, demon-
strating acceptable accuracy in detecting previously unseen
attacks. The overall accuracy reached above 75% for the
KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD data sets. Further and also
important to the application is that the overall accuracy was
achieved at a low FNR for the new attack classes.
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